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As Civil War enthusiasts are almost universally aware, George Gordon Meade, the Army 
of Potomac’s commander at the battle of Gettysburg, possesses something of an unusual 
historiographical bequest. Placed in charge of the North’s principal field force mere days before 
its great Pennsylvania victory, Meade’s creditable work there has been routinely diminished by 
historians, the effects of which have reduced the Philadelphian to near-cipher status within no 
small portion of the battle’s writings. To be sure, criticism of his military performance during the 
summer 1863 campaign began straightway after R. E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia 
withdrew across a rain-swollen Potomac River to gain the necessary space and time to campaign 
anew. Stung by accusations touching his leadership and decision-making by a caviling public 
press over Lee’s “escape,” Meade noted caustically in December that it might yet be revealed 
that he had not been present at Gettysburg in the first place, such had his star fallen in so short a 
time. Still, most serious students are cognizant too that published works rehabilitating Meade’s 
Gettysburg standing, undertaken first by the generals’s son and namesake in 1883, had by the 
early years of the present century gained their own sure footing: books and essays by Civil War 
specialists Edwin B. Coddington, Harry W. Pfanz, Richard A. Sauers, A. Wilson Greene, and 
Stephen W. Sears countered effectively, so it seemed, the more damaging claims of his 
detractors. 
Yet—and unsurprising given Gettysburg’s hold upon Civil War readership—Meade’s 
conduct during the Pennsylvania campaign continues to be contested historiographical terrain. 
Perhaps no better indication of this is Allen C. Guelzo’s iconoclastic Gettysburg: The Last 
Invasion, a sesquicentennial volume that, in revisiting wartime and postbellum charges, roundly 
challenged the general’s actions as well as his manly character, intimating that Meade’s failure to 
close with and finish Lee was spurred by his repudiation of Republican President Abraham 
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Lincoln’s emancipation strategy. In the years since, further rejective takes by Thomas J. Ryan 
and others have mixed with the favorable assessment of John G. Selby as well as thematic, 
contextual offerings of Jennifer M. Murray and this reviewer. Against a background, then, of a 
cumulative literature encompassing thousands of pamphlets, essays, and monographs, it is 
extraordinary that not a single full-length volume had ever been dedicated solely to “Old Four-
Eye” and his army’s fateful fortnight from the Potomac to Pennsylvania and back again. With the 
University of North Carolina Press’s publication of Kent Masterson Brown’s Meade at 
Gettysburg: A Study in Command, a noticeable void now has been filled. 
Brown possesses the credentials required effectively to handle the task. His vitae includes 
Cushing of Gettysburg: The Story of a Union Artillery Commander and Retreat from Gettysburg: 
Lee, Logistics, and the Pennsylvania Campaign, the latter of which placed him among his 
generation’s leading Gettysburg historians. A prodigious primary-source researcher and master 
prose stylist, Brown fashions here an outstanding campaign history, one that ranks highly in a 
genre filled with distinguished titles. His unequivocal representation of Meade on page five of 
his prologue—made possibly in riposte to Guelzo’s more serious allegations—as “an effective 
operational commander and a relentless tactical commander who [was] fully aware of the 
strength and capability of his enemy” may surprise even the general’s most faithful advocates; it 
will at the very least drive additional (and even spirited) discussion of the Potomac army’s 
tetchy, traduced leader. 
Brown’s mastery of manuscript and published primary materials is immediately evident. 
His narrative recounts in astonishing granularity Meade’s command decisions and those of his 
principal subordinates across the course of the campaign, focusing largely, if not entirely, on 
what modern military professionals call the “operational art”—that is, the employment of forces 
to achieve strategic objectives through the planning, sequencing, and execution of tactical 
actions. Brown scours, in addition to the multi-volume Official Records of the Union and 
Confederate Armies, sources from neglected record groups in the National Archives, the 
extensive personal papers of major Federal military actors, accounts from newspaper 
correspondents and other civilians touched by the battle, and contemporary maps ignored 
routinely even by the most proficient Civil War students. Especially welcome is the focus, well 
established in his earlier work, upon the intricacies of military logistics and supply, without 
which no operational study can be considered adequate. Indeed, Meade’s bold decision to outrun 
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his forward-supply base at Westminster, Maryland, in response to what was wing commander 
John Fulton Reynolds’s unilateral—and as Brown contends, unsanctioned—move to commit the 
army’s First Corps at Gettysburg on July 1 represented the vital inflection point of the campaign. 
Similarly, the Philadelphian’s appreciation of the army’s significant post-battle sustainment 
challenges told heavily in his prudent, albeit purposeful, pursuit operation to the Potomac. 
The author is, however, on somewhat less stable ground when attempting to place 
Meade’s planning considerations and operational choices within the context of nineteenth-
century military theory and practice. For example, Brown’s Meade emerges within the book’s 
pages as a commander who issues unambiguous instructions informed in large part by soldier-
theorist Carl von Clausewitz. That this claim might create unease among military historians is 
unmistakable: while it is cheering to read theoretical constructions in any operational work, no 
linear relationship can be made among the Prussian master, whose writings remained little 
known through most of the century, his supposed American “disciple” Dennis Hart Mahan, and 
Mahan’s pupil from West Point’s Class of 1835, George G. Meade. A more robust engagement 
with secondary sources in both Civil War and western military history may have tempered these 
assessments. Then too, how effectively to convey intent to subordinates within a nineteenth-
century milieu typified by mass armies conducting dispersed movements over large areas 
mandated alternate approaches to command. These approaches stressed decentralized control 
systems which obliged subordinates to exercise disciplined initiative within a leader’s defined 
constraints. The commander’s general instructions to Reynolds issued on the morning of the 
battle’s first day are indicative of this trend. Yet Brown chooses instead to emphasize Meade’s 
more peremptory and situationally specific June 30 missive to Reynolds, in addition to aspects of 
the celebrated July 1 Pipe Creek Circular, to underscore a form of direct leadership style that had 
by the 1860s already been challenged by the requirements of modern war. 
Methodological critiques aside, Meade at Gettysburg is an important contribution to Civil 
War literature. It adds to its author’s well-earned status as one of Gettysburg’s scholarly doyens; 
more significantly, its effort to gain understanding of Meade the soldier and his command 
decisions, as well as its recognition of the general’s significant impact upon the battle’s outcome, 
will place it among the Pennsylvania campaign’s prominent and preferred volumes. 
 
Christopher S. Stowe serves as Professor of Military History at the United States Marine Corps 
Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia. The author of numerous essays and reviews in 
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Civil War and nineteenth-century military history, he is completing a full-length, critical 
biography of George Gordon Meade. He can be reached at christopher.stowe@usmcu.edu 
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